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FLORIDA'S UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
SUSAN C. MILLER
"There is a legal crescendo among employers throughout this
country who appropriately contend that they are the risk-takers in
the commercial world; and that, having accumulated trade secrets
while facing and surmounting those risks, they should be protected
from employees to whom they have entrusted their hard-earned
secrets. "'
N THIS age of fast-breaking technological advances, where vast
sums of money are spent on research and development, it is essen-
tial that the state provide the business community adequate and uni-
form protection from the theft of valuable ideas. 2 For too long
businesses have been left to fight their way through the legal intrica-
cies of trade secret law. The law in this area has often been nebulous,
leaving a business uncertain whether it had a remedy for the unjust
misappropriation of its valuable trade secrets. 3 In an effort to con-
front this problem and to help businesses deal more effectively with
industrial espionage and pirating of trade secrets, the Florida Legisla-
ture enacted the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).5 The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act is the work product of the National Uni-
1. Fortune Personnel Agency v. Sun Tech Inc., 423 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (citing
Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies Adequate?, 24 U. FLA. L.
REv. 721 (1972)).
2. See generally Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies Ade-
quate?, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 721 (1972).
3. See Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA.
L. REV. 378, 378-81 (1971).
4. See generally 12 R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 5.05 (1986).
5. Ch. 88-254, § 1-9, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 688.001-.009 (Supp.
1988)). On May 17, 1988 the Florida House of Representatives passed Representative Canady's,
Dem., Lakeland, House Bill 91 with 111 yeas and no nays. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 508 (Reg. Sess. May
17, 1988). The bill was passed with the original language, no amendments, as introduced by
Representative Canady. On June 1, 1988, the Florida Senate substituted House Bill 91 for Senate
Bill 233 proposed by Senator Grant, Dem., Tampa, and passed it with 35 yeas and no nays. FLA.
S. JOUR. 707-08 (Reg. Sess. June 1, 1988). On July 5, 1988, Governor Martinez signed House
Bill 91, ch. 88-254, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, into law. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act had been
previously introduced in the House Commerce Committee in 1980 at the request of Mr. Jon
Shebel, a business lobbyist. However, Proposed Committee Bill 80-15 never passed out of com-
mittee.
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form Law Commissioners,6 who took basic common law trade secret
principles and incorporated them into a workable piece of legislation. 7
Currently twenty-five states, including Florida,8 have adopted the
UTSA in an attempt to settle the conflicting aspects of trade secret
law, to give courts guidance in misappropriation of information cases,
and to bring uniformity to trade secret law. It has been said that "the
parameters of trade secret protection generally defy precise identifica-
tion." 9 The need to identify these parameters supports the adoption of
the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
6. Uniform acts such as the UTSA are the products of a unique organization that has been
working for the improvement of state laws since 1892. The National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws represent state government and the legal profession with more than
300 practicing lawyers, judges, law professors and government officials serving as Uniform Law
Commissioners. They work to encourage the free flow of goods, credit and services, full eco-
nomic growth, and uniformity. Uniform Law Comm'rs press release pamphlet (on file, Florida
State University Law Review). In Florida, there are three members of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. These unpaid members encourage the adoption of
Uniform Acts. The three Florida Commissioners recommended two Uniform Acts for Adoption
in Florida in the 1988 legislative session and both were adopted. Telephone interview with Henry
Kittleson, Florida member of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (July 1988). Specifically, these were the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, ch. 88-254, §§ 1-9,
1988 Fla. Laws 1377 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 688.01-09 (Supp. 1988)), and the Uniform Statu-
tory Rule Against Perpetuities, ch. 88-40, 1988 Fla. Laws 277 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 689.225
(Supp. 1988)).
7. UNri. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 14 U.L.A. 329, 330-31 (Supp.
1988) [hereinafter UTSA]. The UTSA was adopted by the National Conference in 1979; five
amendments were incorporated on the recommendation of the American Bar Association's Pat-
ent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section in 1985. The Florida UTSA includes the 1985
amendments to the UTSA. The specific amendments are not further addressed in this Comment.
However, the author has treated the UTSA with the 1985 amendments as a whole throughout.
8. Alaska: 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws 103 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.910 to
.945); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (1987); California: CAL. Civ. CODE §
3426 (West Supp. 1988); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74 (1986); Connecticut: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1987); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (Supp.
1986); Florida: Ch. 88-254, § 1-9, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 688.001-.009
(Supp. 1988)); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to -807 (Supp. 1988); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
140, paras. 351-359 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (Burns
Supp. 1988); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.3320-.3330 (1983); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §8 51:1431-1439 (West 1987); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541-1548 (Supp.
1987); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01-.08 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988); Montana:
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1987); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 600A.010-
.100 (Michie Supp. 1987); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (Supp. 1987);
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85-95 (West 1987); Oregon: OR. Rav. STAT. § 646.475
(1987); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (Supp. 1987); South Dakota: S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-29-1 to -11 (Supp. 1988); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343
(1987); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010-.940 (Supp. 1988); West Virginia:
W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to -10 (1986); Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West Supp. 1987);
North Carolina enacted a similar statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (Supp. 1981), how-
ever, it differs from common law and the UTSA by deleting the bad faith requirement.
9. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 284 n.37 (1980) (pro-
vides a comprehensive coverage of the UTSA and additional background information).
TRADE SECRETS A CT
The purpose of this Comment is to examine Florida's newly enacted
UTSA and to discuss what effect it may have on existing case law and
statutory regulations. This will be done through a section-by-section
analysis of the statute. The relationship between common law princi-
ples and the law in jurisdictions which have already enacted the uni-
form act will be analyzed. Finally, throughout this Comment the
underlying ethical considerations presented by the UTSA will be ad-
dressed. It will be shown that the primary purpose of the Act is to
preserve standards of commercial ethics and promote fairness in the
litigation of trade secret misappropriations while creating uniformity
among the states.
I. BACKGROUND
Much of present-day trade secret law is summarized in the Restate-
ment of Torts.0 The principles therein are the most often used in de-
ciding trade secret cases." Of course, the Restatement is not the law
and as such its precepts may or may not be adopted. 12 Moreover, the
Restatement itself is meaningless unless it is read in conjunction with
the comments which supplement each of its sections. Another prob-
lem with the Restatement is that:
the second edition of the Restatement of Torts, published in 1979,
deleted all provisions relating to trade secrets. It was the opinion of
the American Law Institute that trade regulation law, of which the
law of trade secrets was a part, had developed into an independent
body of law no longer based primarily upon tort principles. 3
It was the opinion of the American Law Institute that trade secrets
were now to be considered part of property law rather than tort law. 14
Into the void left by the Restatement's abandonment of trade secret
law, the National Uniform Law Commissioners introduced the
UTSA. The UTSA maintains the basic principles of trade secret law
while preserving its distinction from the laws governing patents and
copyrights. 15
Patent and trade secret protection are sought for many of the same
reasons. The primary principle behind both fields of law is that in
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
11. Klitzke, supra note 9, at 278 (citing 12 R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2.01
(1978)).
12. See Klitzke, supra note 9, at 283.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 9A Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 232.02 (1986).
1988]
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each case an owner desires to secure legally his valuable information
from misappropriation or use by another who would gain an unfair
economic advantage. A patent is a federal monopoly which gives a
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling some item. 6
Once a patent is issued, the composition of the information is exposed
to the public by publication. Until the information is protected by pat-
ent law, the applicant relies on trade secret law for protection from
misappropriation of his property. However, once the patent is issued
there is no longer a trade secret remedy, since a trade secret must not
be common knowledge. The general policy difference between the two
is that patent policy is designed to encourage public disclosure of in-
novations, thus promoting additional development, 7 while trade se-
cret law keeps the composition of the information secret.' 8 As stated
in the Restatement of Torts, the policy behind protecting trade secrets
"is not based on a policy of rewarding or otherwise encouraging the
development of secret processes or devices. The protection is merely
against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's
secret."' 19 The positive right to secure a secret is valuable, especially
since the protection offered by patent law can be highly inadequate.
For example, in manufacturing computer components the secret ele-
ment may be outdated long before a patent can be issued. This leaves
trade secret law as the only realistic protection available.20
Other differences between the two further increase the desirability
of having a separate body of trade secret law. A patent right is gener-
ally granted for seventeen years, while a trade secret can be perpet-
ual. 21 Additionally, patents require a showing of novelty; the UTSA
does away with this specific qualification for trade secrets. 22 The reli-
16. See generally Ropski & Kline, A Primer on Intellectual Property Rights: The Basics of
Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Trade Secrets and Related Rights, 50 ALB. L. REV. 405, 411
(1986).
17. Id. at 430.
18. Id. See generally Annotation, Disclosure of Trade Secret as Abandonment of Secrecy,
92 A.L.R.3d 138 (1982) (disclosure of secret information results in abandonment of the trade
secret).
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
20. See generally Comment, supra note 3.
21. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D. Del. 1920) (secret process
for cola syrup is property and may be protected indefinitely).
22. However, some novelty is required or else a secret would not be a secret. Furthermore,
new variations on widely used processes cannot be trade secrets. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Con-
trolled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983). See, e.g., Pressure Science, Inc. v. Kramer,
413 F. Supp. 618 (D. Conn. 1976) (no trade secret where others in industry used same process to
manufacture metal seals and could easily reproduce seals); Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer
Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982) (computer system not secret where it merely combined
known subsystems). Cf. Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971)
(process of tempering effervescent tablets, by leaving in dry room for 24 to 48 hours before
packaging, was a trade secret).
TRADE SECRETS ACT
ance on trade secret law could prove to be less costly and time con-
suming, since patent fees do not have to be paid and the application
process is avoided. One of the vital distinctions between patent, trade
secret, and copyright protection 23 is that trade secret law is the only
type of intellectual property protection which extends to ideas. In view
of the limitations of patent and copyright protection, many businesses
are electing to protect their commercially valuable information by re-
lying solely on trade secret law. 24
While both patent and copyright law are governed by federal law,
trade secret protection is purely a state protected right. The path was
cleared for the states to enact trade secret protection laws when the
United States Supreme Court, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
held that federal patent law does not preempt such state laws. 25
II. FLORIDA'S NEW UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
The UTSA gives a trade secret owner the right to protection from
the misappropriation of trade secrets. While this right has previously
existed under common law, 26 the courts were allowed to exercise great
discretion in defining trade secret law. A laxity of direction occurred
from the many different forms of a cause of action available for trade
secret protection. Liability under common law arises from contract
rights, property rights, or a violation of a fiduciary relationship. 27 The
UTSA combines these into one cause of action. 21 In addition to pro-
viding one cause of action, the UTSA provides for damages and in-
junctions, 29 a statute of limitations,30 and attorney's fees.31 These
23. Copyright protection is of a similar nature as patent law. However, copyright protec-
tion extends only to tangible items which by their very nature are not secret. See Klitzke, supra
note 9, at 289 (discussing qualification requirements under the Patent Act for a trade secret
owner and an inventor).
Essentially, anyone has the right to the same trade secret if they developed the information
by independent means, therefore, the use of the secret will not be limited. Whereas under patent
law the holder of the patent has the exclusive right of use.
24. See Micro Plus, Inc. v. Forte Data Sys., Inc., 484 So. 2d 1340, 1342 n.l (Fla. 4th DCA
1986) (per curiam) ("Research and development in the industry are such that patents and trade-
marks, because they require considerable time to obtain, are not feasible and not readily used to
protect proprietary information.") (finding of fact in lower court's order).
25. 416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974). Section 559.94, Florida Statutes, was held preempted by fed-
eral patent law under the supremacy clause. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
515 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1987) (also discusses relationship between federal patent law and Florida
trade secret law), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1727 (1988).
26. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
27. See Comment, supra note 3, at 383.
28. Ch. 88-254, § 8, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379-80 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.008 (Supp.
1988)).
29. Id. § 3, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.003 (Supp. 1988)).
30. Id. § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.007 (Supp. 1988)).
31. Id. § 5, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.005 (Supp. 1988)).
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provisions elevate the UTSA to a pragmatic and workable statute by
providing specific guidelines.
Since twenty-five states have enacted the UTSA,32 Florida should
benefit from interpretations of the UTSA by these other jurisdictions.
This is especially true since the intent behind the uniform law is to
provide uniformity among states in trade secret law. The first state to
enact the UTSA was Minnesota,33 whose supreme court has deter-
mined that the UTSA more or less embodies their common law defini-
tion of a trade secret.34 Cavitch has noted that the UTSA and the
common law "are in harmony, and both can be cited in support of
the same result." 35 Since Florida common law does not conflict with
the UTSA, Florida courts should reach the same result as courts have
in Minnesota.
A. Definitions
The keystone of the UTSA is its definition section. The definition
of a "trade secret" requires the information to be secret and to have
been used in one's trade or business. The policy behind the statute-
deterrence of unethical business practices-is embodied in the defini-
tion of "improper means," which gives examples of misappropria-
tions which violate prevailing notions of commercial fair play and
integrity.
1. Trade Secrets
The UTSA sets forth three main components as the bases of the
trade secret definition. First, a trade secret must be information; sec-
ond, it must have actual or potential independent economic value
based on its secrecy; and finally, it must be reasonably maintained in
secret.3 6 This definition closely follows the Restatement, but is more
32. See supra note 8.
33. Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 232.02[3].
34. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 899 (Minn. 1983).
35. Z. CAVTCH, supra note 15, § 232.02[3]. Cavitch notes that the Minnesota Court, in
Aries Information Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. App.
1985), cites both the Minnesota version of the UTSA, MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1980) and
Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982) (a pre-UTSA deci-
sion that referred to the UTSA).
36. The UTSA defines a trade secret as follows:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being gener-
ally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
UTSA, supra note 7, § 1(4). See also ch. 88-254, § 2(4), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4) (Supp. 1988)).
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inclusive by providing for programs, methods, and techniques within
the definition of a trade secret.37 Florida courts should be amenable to
the UTSA's definition of a trade secret since the courts have accepted
a broad range of items as trade secrets," including chemical formu-
las,3 9 business information, 4° designs, 41 machinery, 42 manufacturing
37. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) with Ch. 88-254, § 1(4), 1988
Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.001(4) (Supp. 1988)). Cf. Electro-Craft Corp.
v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983) (citing Cherne Indus., Inc. v.
Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979)).
38. Bert Lane Co. v. International Indus., 84 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1955); Lee v. Cercoa, Inc.,
433 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), rev. denied, 444 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1984); Demit of Venez.,
C.A. v. Electronic Water Sys., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (federal courts in Florida
have looked to § 757 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1939)); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P
Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (trade secrets were defined as the Restatement
sets forth). Section 757 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1939) provides that:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable
to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the
other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a
secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third
person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its
disclosure was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939)
Comment b is a frequently cited authority with respect to defining a trade secret. This com-
ment enunciates the following six factors to be considered when determining whether a plain-
tiff's information is a trade secret:
1. [T]he extent to which the information is known outside of his business;
2. the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business;
3. the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information;
4. the value of the information to him and to his competitors;
5. the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information;
6. the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.
Id. comment b.
39. See Sun Crete, Inc. v. Sundeck Prods., Inc., 452 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
(chemical formula for covering concrete surfaces); Dotolo v. Schouten, 426 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1983) (citrus-based pet products).
40. General Hotel & Restaurant Supply Corp. v. Skipper, 514 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA
1987) (certain documents may be a trade secret); Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Egly, 507 So. 2d
1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (citing Standard & Poor's Corp. v Commodity Exch., Inc., 538 F.
Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y.) (statistical information that was difficult and costly to develop), aff'd,
683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982)); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (Fla.
3d DCA) (business methods and prices), cert. denied, 120 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1960).
41. Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968) (design for helicopter
blade mechanism); Bert Lane Co. v. International Indus., 84 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1955) (design of
carousel); Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 391 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (car design).
42. Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960) (machin-
ery for the manufacture of polyurethane foam). See also Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plas-
tics, Inc., 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975) (polypropylene bristles); Biodynamic Technologies, Inc.
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processes, 4 and customer lists."4 The UTSA provides a uniform set of
guidelines to follow in determining whether a trade secret exists.
45
Other jurisdictions which have enacted the UTSA have traditionally
followed the common law test for a trade secret;"6 however, this is
done with the caveat that the language of the UTSA must be followed
to the extent that it modifies or clarifies the common law.47 Therefore,
under the UTSA, Florida's definition of a trade secret should remain
viable." Some Florida cases have more precisely detailed the tradi-
tional common law definition. 49 For example, in Sun Crete, Inc. v.
Sundeck Products, Inc.,5° the court held that a trade secret is more
than a chemical formula. "A trade secret is a plan or process, tool,
mechanism or compound. It includes a unique combination of other-
wise known components, if the combination differs materially from
other methods known in the trade." 5' Florida case law should not be
v. Chattanooga Corp., 644 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (orthopedic continuous passive motion
device); Demit of Venez., C.A. v. Electronic Water Sys., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(electromagnetic water treatment).
43. Lee v. Cercoa, Inc., 433 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (manufacturing process for glass
polishing compound), rev. denied, 444 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1984).
44. Braman Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 479 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (Rolls Royce cus-
tomer service list may be a trade secret); Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA
1982) (list of financial planners interested in selling diamonds, where the list was a distillation of
a larger list, reflecting considerable effort, knowledge, time, and expense is a trade secret); Erik
Elec. Co. v. Elliot, 375 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (light bulb customer list that was the
product of employer's method of great distillation, presented a prima facie case when employee
after taking list took over large portion of employer's trade); Inland Rubber Corp. v. Helman,
237 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (tire customer list is a trade secret when it is confidential
information and when a great expense had been occurred in procuring the list initially). Cf. Pure
Foods, Inc. v. Sir Sirloin, Inc., 84 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1955) (wholesaler's food customer list not
trade secret where list was easily obtainable from classified telephone directories); Keel v. Qual-
ity Medical Sys., 515 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (customer information was not confiden-
tial); Blackstone v. Dade City Osteopathic Clinic, 511 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (list of
patients treated by doctor is not a trade secret); Fish v. Adams, 401 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 5th DCA
1981) (employee may take list that he himself has developed); Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104
So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (customer list of a wholesaler of hotel supplies and variety store
merchandise is not a trade secret since it contained readily ascertainable information).
45. See generally Note, supra note 2.
46. See Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 233.02 (listing jurisdictions that recognize the RE-
STATEM ENT OF TORTS (1939)). Five of the listed states-Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Okla-
homa, and Wisconsin-have adopted the UTSA.
47. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc. 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983).
48. In Lee v. Cercoa, 433 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the court cited 2 R. CALLMAN,
UNFAIR CoMPETITiON, TRaDEMARKS & MONOPOLIES section 51.1, at 349-50 (3rd ed. 1967) and the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, section 757, comment b (1939) as the source of a trade secret definition.
49. See Sun Crete, Inc. v. Sundeck Prods., Inc., 452 So. 2d 973, 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
50. 452 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
51. Id. at 975 (citing 2 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES, §
14.07 (4th ed. 1982)).
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overturned by enactment of the UTSA and may be relied upon for
construing the definition of "trade secrets" as used in the UTSA.
In the UTSA definition of a trade secret, several departures from
the Restatement are notable. Whereas the Restatement lists formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information,5 2 the UTSA adds pro-
gram, method, and technique to the list." "Program" was added to
include computer programs,5 4 and "method and technique" extend
the definition to include the concept of "know-how."" Know-how is
the knowledge that is gained by an employee during the course of his
employment.5 6 However, the definition of know-how does not include
general knowledge that was not given in a confidential manner, nor
does it include knowledge gained in the normal course of business.5 7
This distinction between know-how and general knowledge is dem-
onstrated in Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer." An employee made plans
to establish a competing business using the employer's customer list.
The court found that since there was no confidential relationship and
the list was comprised of a readily ascertainable class, there was no
trade secret. Here the employees's skill and knowledge were defined as
"assets gained by an employee which are transferable to his future use
in business and in life and which become a part of his own mental
equipment. It is impossible to leave them behind so long as they exist
within the mind of the employee." 5 9 As a result of the fine distinction
between employee know-how and the misappropriation of a trade se-
cret, no definite standard has been established to guide employers or
employees.
One factor which may help with this distinction is the nature of the
relationship between the parties. To find a misappropriation of know-
how, the courts look for a breach of a confidential relationship.6 An
52. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
53. Ch. 88-254, § 1(4), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.001(4)
(Supp. 1988)).
54. See University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1974); Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (com-
puter program found to be a trade secret), aff'dper curiam, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972).
55. UTSA, supra note 7, § I comment.
56. Cf. Foster & Co. v. Snodgrass, 333 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (employee's knowl-
edge gained during his experience as a hardware salesman, while not a trade secret was, by virtue
of a noncompetitive agreement, found to be of value).
57. See generally Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 233.04. Florida cases look for a confidential
relationship or a noncompetitive agreement. See Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122
So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).
58. 104 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958).
59. Id. at 645.
60. Z. CAVrrCH, supra note 15, § 233.02 (citing Chomerics, Inc. v. Ehrreich, 12 Mass. App.
Ct. 1, 421 N.E.2d 453 (1981)). Cf. Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232
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example of this may be found in Chomerics, Inc. v. Ehrreich,61 in
which the defendant was a founder, officer, and director of the plain-
tiff corporation. The defendant, as part of his job, helped develop
electrically-conductive plastics for the electronic industry. The results
of his experiments were kept in locked notebooks, although the com-
pany did not consider the results to be valuable. The defendant left
the company and after the time required in his non-competition agree-
ment, became co-founder and principal of a research and consulting
firm. At this point, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant misappro-
priated some of its "concepts." The court held that the defendant had
only taken the knowledge of possibilities and goals gained as part of
his overall experience as a scientist. 62 The information acquired had
never been treated as secret; therefore, the knowledge was not a se-
cret.
The Restatement only offers a type of template through which facts
are squeezed to press out an equitable remedy. The UTSA overcomes
this haphazard method by setting forth certain elements that must be
met before a cause of action may be found. 63 If the plaintiff can sub-
stantiate all factors provided for in the statute, then the fine line dis-
tinction becomes less blurred and future trade secret litigants will have
guidance on how to proceed in trade secret litigation.
Arguments that were persuasive to courts under the common law
trade secret cases should carry over into the reasoning of UTSA cases.
However, there are aspects of the new law that will enlarge the scope
of the existing common law. For a secret to be protected under prior
Florida law, it had to have actual economic value. The UTSA expands
the definition to include secrets that have potential economic value.64
Klitzke explains that "[i]nformation regarding a future manufacturing
process may have no present commercial value and yet have economic
value, as where time and effort have been expended in its develop-
ment." 65 Additionally, under the Restatement, a trade secret had to be
in continuous use in the operation of the business. 66 Under the UTSA,
(Fla. 3d DCA 1960) (court held that the employee's knowledge of the trade secrets from the
previous firm would be so entwined with his new employment as to render ineffective an injunc-
tion directed only toward a prevention of disclosure of trade secrets; therefore, a restraining
injunction on employment would be upheld until all facts were brought forth in trial).
61. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 1,421 N.E.2d 453 (1981).
62. Id. at 9-10, 421 N.E.2d at 458-59.
63. Ch. 88-254, § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.002 (Supp.
1988)).
64. Id. § 2(4)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4)(a) (Supp.
1988)).
65. Klitzke, supra note 9, at 289.
66. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
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a single event is protected. The UTSA further extends protection
where the employer has not yet put the trade secret to use. 67 This in-
cludes negative information, such as information which is the result of
expensive and time consuming research which proved that a certain
process will not work. 68
Another difference between the UTSA and the Restatement defini-
tion of a trade secret is that a "customer list" is not found in the
UTSA definition but is specifically mentioned in the comments to the
Restatement.69 However, Florida common law has more than ade-
quately interpreted this area of the law and these well-reasoned opin-
ions should be followed in spite of the omission in the UTSA. To
illustrate, in Unistar Corp. v. Child70 the employer, Unistar, was in
the business of selling investment grade diamonds and gemstones
through financial planners. Over a period of three years Unistar
amassed a list of 4,200 planners by screening some 12,000 known
planners and spending $800,000 in advertising, attending conventions,
and conducting training programs. From the 4,200, only 1,850 finan-
cial planners were actually signed on as dealers, and of those only 274
actually sold Unistar's diamonds. When employees left the company
and started a competing business, Unistar's sales fell by eighty-four
percent. The former employees never denied that they used Unistar's
customer list. They argued that the list was available to the public and
therefore not a trade secret. The court found that the list was a reflec-
tion of considerable effort, knowledge, time, and expense and there-
fore was properly qualified as a trade secret. 7 ' The court explicitly
stated that "[t]he law will import into every contract of employment a
prohibition against the use of a trade secret by the employee for his
own benefit, to the detriment of his employer, if the secret was ac-
quired by the employee in the course of his employment." 7 2 Thus, a
customer list will be considered a trade secret if it can be shown that a
great deal of time and money went into the compilation of the list.
67. UTSA, supra note 7, § I comment.
68. Id. (citing Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.) (per curiam) (liability
imposed for developmental cost savings with respect to product not marketed), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975)).
69. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
70. 415 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
71. Id. at 734.
72. Id. See also Kozuch v. Cra-Mar Video Center, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (names of purchasers of video hardware and purchasers of memberships were considered
trade secrets since not generally known to competitors). Cf. Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp.,
402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968) (employee's knowledge of the employer's customers normally not a
trade secret).
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However, a customer list is not a trade secret if the customers are
members of a readily ascertainable class. 73
The UTSA also addresses the secrecy requirement for trade secrets:
information generally known within the industry is not a trade se-
cret.7 4 The statutory language, "not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons, ' 75
does not mean trade secret rights are only lost if the general public
knows the information. 76 Instead, the UTSA focuses on those who can
acquire an economic benefit from the trade secret. 77 "A method of
casting metal, for example, may be unknown to the general public but
readily known within the foundry industry, ' 78 and thus would be con-
sidered generally known and not a trade secret.
The last major requirement for a trade secret is that reasonable ef-
forts must have been taken to maintain the secrecy of a trade secret.
The rights to a trade secret have been found to be extinguished when a
company discloses its trade secret to someone not obligated to protect
the confidentiality of such information. 79 However, the trade secret
owner is not required to protect against unanticipated, undetectable or
unpreventable methods of discovery. 80 "The efforts required to main-
tain secrecy are those 'reasonable under the circumstances.' ','8 For ex-
ample, in E.L duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,82 while the
plaintiff's chemical plant was being built, the defendants flew over the
site and took aerial photographs. A skilled engineer could determine
the secret process for making methanol from these photographs. 83 The
73. Pure Foods, Inc. v. Sir Sirloin, Inc., 84 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1955); Renpak, Inc. v. Oppen-
heimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958).
74. Ch. 88-254, § 2(4)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4)(a)
(Supp. 1988)). The criteria for what is generally known is not always easily ascertainable. In
Pressure Science, Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618 (D. Conn. 1976), the court applied trade
secret law adopted from the Restatement to find that although the plaintiff honestly believed
that its manufacturing methods were unique and secret, they had in fact been utilized by or were
known to companies in the industry for many years.
75. Id. § 2(4)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4)(a) (Supp.
1988)).
76. See generally Engineered Mechanical Servs., Inc. v. Langlois, 464 So. 2d 329 (La. Ct.
App. 1984) (a trade secret cannot be a process or procedure which is a matter of public knowl-
edge).
77. UTSA, supra note 7, § I comment.
78. Id.
79. Eli Lilly & Co. v. EPA, 615 F. Supp. 811, 820 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
80. Aries Information Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d 366, 368
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
81. UTSA, supra note 7, § I comment.
82. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1970). The drafters of the UTSA
relied on this case as an example of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. UTSA, supra note 7,
§ 1 comment.
83. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1013-14.
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court recognized this as a misappropriation of a trade secret that was
reasonably protected. 84 The company was not required to first build a
cover for the whole plant and then begin the actual building. The
company had taken measures against observation on the ground;
therefore, it had done what was reasonable under the circumstances.
The UTSA will not change Florida law in this regard because Florida
common law already recognizes that trade secrets must be reasonably
safeguarded .85
In summary, under the UTSA, there are three main requirements
which must be met before the information will be regarded as a trade
secret. It must be information, it must have actual or potential inde-
pendent economic value, and it must be reasonably maintained in se-
cret. As a guide to determining whether these various requirements are
met, the UTSA list of examples should not be construed as being ex-
clusive. As already noted, in Florida a customer list has been included
within the definition of a trade secret. Although not specifically listed
in the UTSA, a customer list should be included in the broad term
"information."
If a trade secret is found, the next step in the analysis is to deter-
mine if there has been a misappropriation. The trade secret must have
been misappropriated in an unethical manner.
2. Misappropriation
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the United States Supreme
Court noted that one of the main policies behind trade secret law is
"the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics." ' 86 In carrying
forth this banner of moral rectitude, the UTSA centers its cause of
action around the definitions of "improper means" and "misappro-
priation."
Under common law, a trade secret misappropriation case sounded
in tort, contract or both.87 The UTSA simplifies the process so that
only one cause of action is necessary under trade secret misappropria-
tion. 88 This is important since under common law "[d]ifferent ap-
84. Id. at 1016-17.
85. See Lee v. Cercoa, Inc., 433 So. 2d I (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), rev. denied, 444 So. 2d 417
(1984).
86. 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). See also UTSA, supra note 7, § 1 comment.
87. Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 235.01.
88. See id. "Misappropriation" is defined by the UTSA as:
(a) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(b) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent
by a person who:
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proaches attached to tort and contract actions for
misappropriations. '" 9 For example, the statute of limitations in a tort
action may differ from that in a contract action. 90 Under the UTSA,
neither tort nor contract law provides a cause of action; instead a
cause of action is brought directly under the UTSA. 91
Both the Restatement92 and the UTSA 93 require that the acquisition
of the trade secret be by improper means, that is, either some kind of
taking or wrongful disclosure of the trade secret. Under the UTSA,
the definition of improper means begins the misappropriation analysis
with a two pronged approach. To be an improper means, the informa-
tion must be obtained either (1) by wrongful means or (2) through a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy. 94 Both of these issues should be
examined by the court when determining if there has been a misappro-
priation.
Two additional requirements are set forth under the misappropria-
tion section. These requirements are that the trade secret be misappro-
priated by one who: (1) knows or has reason to know that the
information was gained by improper means, 9 or (2) obtains the trade
secret through accident or mistake. 96 The first issue is self-explana-
tory. The owner is given relief in the second situation only when his
conduct does not constitute a failure of efforts that are reasonable
1. Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
2. At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge
of the trade secret was:
a. Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;
b. Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit
its use; or
c. Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
3. Before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know that it was
a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
UTSA, supra note 7, § 1. See also ch. 88-254, § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 688.002 (Supp. 1988)).
89. Klitzke, supra note 9, at 296. See generally R. MILRIM, supra note 4, §§ 3.01-.05 (pro-
tection of trade secrets by contract).
90. Klitzke, supra note 9, at 296 n.93; R. Mm~our, supra note 4, § 4.01.
91. The UTSA specifically exempts contractual remedies whether or not based upon misap-
propriation of a trade secret. Ch. 88-254, § 8, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379-80 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 688.008 (Supp. 1988)).
92. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a) (1939) ("One who discloses or uses another's trade
secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by im-
proper means .... ").
93. Ch. 88-254, § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.002 (Supp.
1988)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy 97 and the misappropri-
ating party has not materially changed positions before becoming
aware that the information is a trade secret. 9 Here, the UTSA paral-
lels the Restatement which maintains that it is the improper means of
obtaining the secret that makes it wrongful. 99
The UTSA l' ° and the Restatement'01 both impose liability for con-
tinuing to use information after discovering that the information is
really a trade secret. However, one important difference is that the
UTSA does not give absolute immunity to all third parties who have
paid for the information in good faith as does the Restatement. Under
the UTSA, liability is imposed on anyone-even one who obtained the
information in good faith-who continues to use the information af-
ter learning that the information is a trade secret. 10 2 Additionally, a
third party is liable if he knows or has reason to know that the infor-
mation was obtained by improper means.1 o This extends to the situa-
tion in which the second appropriator knows that the misappropriator
had a duty to maintain the secrecy. 104
The Restatement is not binding on the courts, therefore, they could
pick and choose which elements listed in the Restatement would be
used in determining if there were to be liability. 105 However, in bring-
ing an action under the UTSA all elements must be met.' °6 For exam-
ple, in College Life Insurance v. Austin, 10 7 the court correctly held
that since the information failed one of the elements, the analysis
should go no further.
To recapitulate, under the UTSA the standards for determining
misappropriation are set forth. A defendant is liable if (1) he used
improper means to gain access to the information; (2) he used a trade
97. UTSA, supra note 7, § I comment.
98. Klitzke, supra note 9, at 300.
99. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 comment b (1939).
100. Ch. 88-254, § 2(2)(b)(2), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
688.002(2)(b)(2) (Supp. 1988)).
101. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 comment b (1939).
102. Klitzke, supra note 9, at 300.
103. UTSA, supra note 7, § 2 comment.
104. Ch. 88-254, § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.002 (Supp.
1988)).
105. See Comment, The Secret's Out: California's Adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act-Effects on the Employer-Employee Relationship, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1167, 1220 n.254
(1987). The author cites Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn.
1983), which quotes Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys. Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn.
1982), as stating "[w]e recognize that the confidential relationship is also a prerequisite to an
action for misappropriation."
106. Id. at 1220 (citing College Life Ins. v. Austin, 466 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. 1984)).
107. 466 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. 1984) (court found no trade secret to protect).
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secret that was given to him in a confidential relationship; (3) while on
notice of a possible trade secret, he obtained the information from a
third person who acquired it through improper means or the breach of
a duty; or (4) after receiving the information by accident or mistake,
he continued using the information after learning that it was a trade
secret. One caveat is that in order for the trade secret owner to recover
damages, a good faith appropriator must not have materially changed
his position in reliance on the information. 08
3. Improper Means
The definition of improper means is actually a list of included ac-
tions: "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic
or other means."' ° Improper means are those actions which fall be-
low the customarily accepted standards of commercial morality and
reasonable conduct.
As illustrated in E.L duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,"10
"improper means" incorporates more than merely illegal behavior. It
is certainly not illegal to fly around and take pictures; however, the
underlying intent of the action was to gain an economic benefit from
the efforts of another."' The Restatement"2 and the UTSA establish a
standard of ethical business practices which the business community is
required to uphold.
The UTSA list of improper means is not to be considered as all
inclusive. Indeed, the drafters of the UTSA specifically point out that
"[a] complete catalogue of improper means is not possible."" 3 To
counterbalance the incompleteness of the definition, the Commission-
108. Ch. 88-254, § 4(1), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.004(1)
(Supp. 1988)).
109. Id., § 2(1), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1378 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.002(1) (Supp. 1988)).
110. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1970).
111. Id.
112. "Improper means" is a concept taken directly from the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, section
757 (1939). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 comment b (1939) (parenthetical omitted):
The mere use of another's trade secret is not of itself tortious. It is the improper
means involved in his discovery of the secret that makes its use wrongful. If these
means disclose no misconduct on his own part, but only mistake or misconduct by
others in disclosing the secret, he is not chargeable with that mistake or misconduct
unless he has notice of it.
Id.
113. UTSA, supra note 7, § 1 comment (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment f
(1939)).
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ers included a catalog of "proper means. 11 14 Proper means of discov-
ery may be made through independent invention, reverse engineering
and any other fair and honest means." 5 The term "improper means"
as developed in the UTSA is a synthesis of the Restatement. The
UTSA does not greatly change the common law precepts of improper
means and misappropriation as already developed. Additionally, since
Florida case law is sparse on this direct point, other jurisdictions' con-
structions of the uniform law may aid in the interpretation of Flori-
da's statute.
After establishing that the information is indeed a trade secret and
that it has been misappropriated, the next concern of the plaintiff is to
receive relief. Under the UTSA, both injunctive relief and damages
may be awarded.
B. Remedies
Under the UTSA, a trade secret owner may be granted both equita-
ble and legal relief. " 6 The UTSA should simplify litigation in the area
of remedies. Under the common law, many of these types of cases
would resolve the issues of damages and liability in bifurcated trials,
that will be unnecessary under the UTSA, since the causes of action as
found in common law are combined." 7
1. Injunctive Relief
Damages may be awarded when there has been a wrongful use of
the owner's trade secret. However, damages are often hard to prove,
so the only type of relief available may be an injunction."' Addition-
ally, money damages may not compensate for all harm arising from
114. Id. "Proper means" include:
1. Discovery by independent invention;
2. Discovery by "reverse engineering," that is, by starting with the known product
and working backward to find the method by which it was developed. The acquisition
of the known product must, of course, also be by a fair and honest means, such as
purchase of the item on the open market for reverse engineering to be lawful;
3. Discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret;
4. Observation of the item in public use or on public display;
5. Obtaining the trade secret from published literature.
115. Id.
116. Ch. 88-254, §§ 3-4, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 688.003-.004
(Supp. 1988)).
117. See 12B R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 7.08(3)(a) (1986).
118. See Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974) ("It is precisely because
damages are so difficult to show that injunctive relief becomes a favored remedy.").
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the violation." 9 For example, in Chessick Clinic, P.A. v. Jones,120 the
plaintiff had lost profits and goodwill as a result of the defendant's
wrongful competition, but no remedy existed at law because this type
of harm was considered too speculative to measure in dollars and
cents. The only realistic remedy available was an injunction. 2' The
UTSA adopts the theory that an injunction may be granted for the
duration of time it would have taken the defendant to discover the
trade secrets through any other lawful means. 22 Florida follows this
principle. 2 3
To obtain a preliminary injunction under Florida common law, the
plaintiff must show that irreparable harm will occur if the injunction
is not given and that there is no adequate remedy except injunctive
relief.'24 However, this standard of relief is less stringent than it may
at first appear. Irreparable harm is presumed where the cause of ac-
tion involves a wrongful interference with a business relationship, as
most trade secret cases do.2 5 Furthermore, the standard of relief for a
permanent injunction is met when all the elements for a trade secret
misappropriation are found. 2 6
Injunctive relief under the UTSA follows the same pattern,' 27 but
the categories of relief are streamlined to require that the plaintiff
demonstrate only a reasonable likelihood of success, or that the actual
or threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm
that the grant of an injunction may inflict on the defendants. 28 Also,
119. Capraro v. Lanier Business Prods., Inc., 445 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (breach of
contract may not leave adequate remedy except injunctive relief in case of an employee contract
which contains a covenant not to compete).
120. 367 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
121. Id. It is worth noting that under Florida law a plaintiff is required to put up bond for
temporary injunctions. See FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.610(b). See also Barnett v. Bacardi, 394 So. 2d
1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
122. UTSA, supra note 7, § 1 comment (citing K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471
(9th Cir. 1974)).
123. See Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).
124. See Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). See also Capraro v.
Lanier Business Prods., Inc., 445 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
125. See Dotolo v. Schouten, 426 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (injunctive relief granted)
Implicit in the holding was the recognition that irreparable injury may be presumed in cases
involving wrongful interference with a business relationship; it need not be alleged or proven in
order to receive a preliminary injunction.
126. See Lee v. Cercoa, Inc., 433 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
127. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn.
1983) (without a proven trade secret there is no cause of action, even if the defendants' actions
were wrongful).
128. See Kozuch v. Cra-Mar Video Center, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110, 113-14 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (citing College Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Austin, 466 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(plaintiff met all factors necessary for an injunction)). The Indiana Legislature intended to serve
the public interest by giving protection to trade secrets which are valuable assets to any business.
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the plaintiff must show that by granting the injunction the public in-
terest would be served.129
These categories do not conflict with Florida law, since in Silvers v.
Dis-Com Securities, Inc.,130 the court set forth similar requirements as
necessary for injunctive relief.' 3 ' Where a statute specifically provides
for injunctive relief, Florida courts have found that if the proof sup-
ports the skeletal allegations of a cause of action, temporary or emer-
gency injunctive relief will be granted. 3 2 This is particulary true where
most or all of the harm may be done long before a final judgment is
entered.'33
A primary consideration in granting injunctive relief is the determi-
nation of the length of time the injunction should be enforced. There
are two schools of thought. First, that the injunction should last for
the length of time it would have taken the misappropriator to have
discovered the information by ethical means. 134 Second, that the court
should have the power to issue a punitive perpetual injunction,'35
based on the unethical nature of the theft. 3 6 The Commissioners lean
toward the first position. 3 7 The UTSA maintains the principle "that
an injunction should last for as long as is necessary, but no longer
than is necessary, to eliminate the commercial advantage or 'lead
time' with respect to good faith competitors that a person has ob-
tained through misappropriation."' 38 In other words, the injunction
should terminate at the time when any advantage gained by the misap-
propriator is lost because the trade secret has become known to good
faith competitors. 119
129. Id.
130. 403 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
131. Id. at 1136 (citing Contemporary Interiors, Inc. v. Four Marks, Inc., 384 So. 2d 734,
735 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)).
132. Silvers v. Dis-Com Sec., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1133, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
133. Id.
134. See Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 232.02[2].
135. Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
136. See Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 232.02[2].
137. The UTSA defines this important remedy:
Injunctive relief:
(I) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the
court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but
the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order
to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misap-
propriation.
UTSA, supra note 7, § 3. See also ch. 88-254, § 3, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 688.003 (Supp. 1988)).
138. UTSA, supra note 7, § 2 comment.
139. Id. See also K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974) (injunction
granted only for time it took for good faith competitors to discover trade secret though reverse
engineering or independent development).
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Florida courts have also held that the common law injunction is of
a temporary character and is subject to dissolution or continuance as
the circumstances and facts-indicate or require. 14° The court in Aero-
sonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp. stated that an injunction "should never
be broader than is necessary to secure to the injured party, without
injustice to the adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the
particular case.' ' 41 Additionally, Florida courts have held that an in-
junction in the case of a misappropriation by an ex-employee only
requires the ex-employee to cease from using the trade secret-while
allowing him to continue using any know-how that is his rightful
property. 4
2
The injunctions discussed above are all of a prohibitive nature; they
seek to maintain rather than alter the status quo between the parties.
This is accomplished by requiring either an affirmative or negative ac-
tion on the part of the defendant to protect the trade secret. The
UTSA provides an alternative to these types of prohibitive injunc-
tions, when equity would otherwise not be served.4 3 If the court
should determine that any prohibition of future use would be unrea-
sonable, the court may condition future use on payment of a roy-
alty. 1' The royalty referred to in this section must be distinguished
from the royalty referred to in the damages section. Here, the royalty
regulates a misappropriator's future conduct and is granted only in
exceptional circumstances. 45 In the damages section, the award is for
a misappropriator's past conduct and may be awarded as a general
option.24 Furthermore, injunctive relief will ordinarily preclude a
monetary award for a period in which the injunction is effective. 47
One exceptional circumstance warranting an injunctive royalty is an
overriding public interest that makes an injunction inappropriate. 48 In
140. Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).
141. 402 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Florida Peach Orchards, Inc. v. State, 190 So. 2d
796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)).
142. See Inland Rubber Corp. v. Helman, 237 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (quoting
Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)).
143. The second part of the injunction section of the UTSA provides:
(2) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon pay-
ment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use could
have been prohibited. Exceptional circumstances include, but are not limited to, a
material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to
know of misappropriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable.
USTA, supra note 7, § 2(b). See also ch. 88-254, § 3(2), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 688.003(2) (Supp. 1988)).
144. Id.
145. See UTSA, supra note 7, § 3 comment.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. § 2 comment.
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Republic Aviation Corp. v. Schenk, 14 9 for example, the court would
not grant an injunction prohibiting the misappropriator from supply-
ing aircraft weapons control systems when to do so would have en-
dangered military personnel in Vietnam. The overriding public interest
called for allowing the misappropriator to continue using the trade
secret. Thus the only type of relief available to the owner of the trade
secret was the granting of a royalty. However, the royalty is permitted
only in situations where the misappropriator has obtained a competi-
tive advantage. 15 0
Another exceptional circumstance is a good faith third-party's reli-
ance on the innocently acquired information.' The court may decide
that restraining future use of the trade secret is unwarranted, and a
royalty would act as a more equitable remedy to all parties. 5 2 The
UTSA is basically consistent with the Restatement in this regard, ex-
cept that the UTSA rejects absolute immunity for good faith purchas-
ers of a trade secret misappropriated by another.' 53
In addition to prohibitive injunctions and royalty injunctions, the
UTSA allows the court to grant affirmative relief, in the form a man-
datory injunction. 5 4 This type of injunction may require that the mis-
appropriator return the fruits of the misappropriation which may
include such items as blueprints, photographs, recordings, or ma-
chines. "I
2. Damages
The UTSA allows damages to be based on actual loss and unjust
enrichment or a reasonable royalty. 5 6 Actual damages for trade secret
149. 152 U.S.P.Q. 830, 834-35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (cited in UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 14 U.L.A. 337 (Supp. 1988)).
150. UTSA, supra note 7, § 2 comment.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758(b) (1939) with UTSA, supra note 7, § 2 com-
ment.
154. Ch. 88-254, § 3(3), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.003(3)
(Supp. 1988)).
155. UTSA, supra note 7, § 2 comment.
156. The UTSA provides that:
(1) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to
acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary re-
covery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation.
Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing
actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused
by misappropriation may be measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable roy-
alty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
UTSA, supra note 7, § 3. See also ch. 88-254, § 4, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 688.004 (Supp. 1988)).
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misappropriation are only recoverable for the period in which the
trade secret was protected and for any time period in which the misap-
propriator will retain an advantage over good faith competitors be-
cause of the misappropriation.' 5 However, damages may only be
awarded to the extent that the defendant has not changed his position
in reliance on a trade secret acquired in good faith, without reason to
know of the misappropriation.1"8 Additionally, a claim for net profits
and actual damages can be merged with a claim for injunctive relief,
"but, if both claims are granted, the injunctive relief ordinarily will
preclude a monetary award for a period in which the injunction is
effective."' 15 9 In other words, a plaintiff is not allowed double recov-
ery.
Under common law, courts in Florida have looked at a number of
methods for computing damages including assessments based on the
benefit of the misappropriation to the defendant and the effects of the
misappropriation on the plaintiff's profits. 6° In Demit of Venezuela,
C.A. v. Electronic Water Systems, Inc. ,161 the defendant was em-
ployed as a salesman selling an electronic water treatment system. As
one of his jobs, he purchased the chemicals for the system. Although
the defendant was never explicitly told that he was being given the
secret formula, he was on notice that his employer kept the formula as
a closely held secret. The defendant left his job after signing a dissolu-
tion agreement in which he agreed not to manufacture water treat-
ment equipment or use or reveal any of the employer's confidential
material. However, within three months of leaving, the defendant was
producing a water treatment system. The court found that the defen-
dant had misappropriated a legal trade secret. 162 In assessing damages,
it appeared more logical to the court to base the remedy on a fair
assessment of the benefit of the trade secret to the defendant since the
defendant's financial records provided an indication of the trade se-
cret's value. 63 Thus, a reasonable royalty was the most fair and equi-
157. UTSA, supra note 7, § 3 comment.
158. See id. (citing Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 1950 (2d
Cir. 1949)). The Commissioners cited Conmar as an example where no relief was granted: the
defendant innocently committed $40,000 to develop the trade secret prior to notification of mis-
appropriation. However, Milgrim points out that in relying on Conmar, the Commissioners
overlooked the significance of the issuance of a patent disclosing the trade secret. R. MILGRIM,
supra note 4, at A-13 n.21.
159. UTSA, supra note 7, § 3 comment.
160. Demit of Venez., C.A. v. Electronic Water Sys., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 850, 854 (S.D. Fla.
1982).
161. Id. at 850.
162. Id. at 853.
163. Id. at 854.
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table standard for assessing damages.16 Additionally, injunctive relief
was given to halt the unauthorized use of the trade secret. 65
The UTSA provides no guidance on how to compute the exact fig-
ures involved in granting a royalty. In Demit of Venezuela, C.A.,
there were adequate financial records which provided insight into the
trade secret's value; however, this is not always the case and the
courts may need further guidance. "'To adopt a reasonable royalty as
the measure of damages is to adopt and interpret, as well as may be,
the fiction that a license was to be granted at the time of beginning the
infringement, and then to determine what the license price should
have been." ' 16 "Reasonable royalty" means more than just a per-
centage of the actual profits; it means "'[t]he actual value of what has
been appropriated.' ",67 When even this cannot be determined, courts
have been forced to fall back on a reasonable estimate of the value of
the trade secret.168
A court may award exemplary darnages in addition to actual dam-
ages if the misappropriation was willful and malicious. 69 This award
may not exceed twice the amount of the initial recovery. 170 If provable
damages are insignificant, an award under this section will not pro-
vide a sufficient deterrent, especially if the defendant is deep-pock-
eted.171 One commentator has suggested eliminating the cap "where
actual damages are relatively small, and the circumstances warrant
disproportionate exemplary damages to serve as a meaningful eco-
nomic deterrent.' ' 7 2 This is a good suggestion and one the Florida
Legislature should consider.
C. Attorney's Fees
In addition to compensating remedies, attorney's fees are allowed
to deter willful and malicious misappropriation, specious claims of
misappropriation, and frivolous litigation. The UTSA provides: "If a
claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate
164. Id. (using the standard described in University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown
Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536-38 (5th Cir. 1974)).
165. Id.
166. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 537 (5th Cir.
1974) (quoting Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., 23 F.2d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1928)).
167. Id. (quoting Vitro Corp. of Am. v. Hall Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 1961)).
168. Id.
169. Ch. 88-254, § 4(2), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.004(2)
(Supp. 1988)).
170. Id.
171. See R. MrtGium, supra note 4, at A-13 n.i (appendix).
172. Id. at A-12 n.20.
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an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or willful and malicious
misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party."'1 3 In general, attorney's fees are consid-
ered punitive, with the essential triggering element for the award being
bad faith on the part of the unsuccessful litigant. 74
There has been much litigation in Florida concerning the awarding
of attorney's fees in trade secret litigation and this will prove helpful
in dealing with.the UTSA. Moreover, Florida case law sets up excel-
lent guidelines for determining the amount to be awarded as a reason-
able attorney's fee while the UTSA lacks these guidelines. In Alston v.
Sundeck Products, Inc.,'17 the court recognized that the fixed fee of
the attorney's contract should be considered as a factor in determining
the amount to be awarded, as this will usually constitute the best evi-
dence of the reasonable value.of the attorney's service. The court re-
lied on Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe176 for the
formula for determining an awa-d of reasonable attorney's fees when
the prevailing party is entitled by statute to such fees. The formula
uses the criteria set forth in The Florida Bar Code of Professional
Responsibility. 17
The attorney's fees provision of the UTSA helps balance the equa-
tion between plaintiff and defendant. This is done by encouraging the
plaintiff to consider more carefully the likelihood of success, while
allowing the defendant to consider how he wants to proceed once a
complaint is filed. 7 1
173. Ch. 88-254, § 5, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.005 (Supp.
1988)). See also UTSA, supra note 7, § 4 comment.
174. See K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974) (no attorney's fees
awarded when plaintiff did not act in bad faith).
175. 498 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
176. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
177. See id. at 1150. The FLORIDA CODE OF PROaESSIONAL RESPONSItIITY, DR 2-106(b) pro-
vides the following criteria:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the question involved,
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular em-
ployment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal service.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
178. See id. at 1149.
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D. Preservation of Secrecy
The UTSA provides the court with broad authority to protect trade
secrets before, du'ring, and after the trial. 179 The intent is to provide
reasonable assurances of secrecy so that meritorious trade secret litiga-
tion is not chilled.8 0 Florida's evidence code also protects litigants'
trade secrets from disclosure by granting the owner of the trade secret
a privilege to refuse to disclose the trade secret if doing so will not
conceal fraud or cause an injustice.'8 '
E. Statute of Limitations
The UTSA's statute of limitations provision eliminates some of the
confusion found in trade secret law in three respects. First, it specifies
a time limitation for initiating suit; second, it defines when a cause of
action accrues; and third, it provides a rule for continuing violations.
Under prior common law, an action for misappropriation could be
brought either in tort or in contract, which would also affect the ap-
plicable statute of limitations. 182 Under the UTSA, all actions for mis-
appropriation of a trade secret must be brought within three years. 8 3
179. The pertinent section states:
In an action under this act, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret
by reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in connection with
discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action,
and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade
secret without prior court approval.
UTSA, supra note 7, § 5. See also ch. 88-254, § 6, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 688.006 (Supp. 1988)).
180. UTSA, supra note 7, § 5 comment.
181. FLA. STAT. § 90.506(1987) provides:
A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent other persons from dis-
closing, a trade secret owned by him if the allowance of the privilege will not conceal
fraud or otherwise work injustice. When the court directs disclosure, it shall take the
protective measures that the interests of the holder of the privilege, the interests of the
parties, and the furtherance of justice require. The privilege may be claimed by the
person or his agent or employee.
Under this section of the Florida Statutes there has been much litigation dealing with pretrial
procedures, and these cases present adequate guidelines for the implementation of the UTSA.
See e.g. Eastern Cement Corp. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 512 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA
1987); General Hotel & Restaurant Supply Corp. v. Skipper, 514 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA
1987); Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Egly, 507 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Fortune Person-
nel Agency, Inc. v. Sun Tech Inc., 423 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); East Colonial Refuse
Serv. v. Velocci, 416 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Becker Metals Corp. v. West Fla. Scrap
Metals, 407 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
182. Klitzke, supra note 9, at 306-07.
183. Ch. 88-254, § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.007 (Supp.
1988)). This section provides that "[an action for misappropriation must be brought within 3
years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have been discovered. For the purposes of this section, a continuing misappropriation constitutes
a single claim."
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The time for bringing such an action runs from the time the misappro-
priation is discovered or should have been discovered. 18 4 This standard
provides certainty for the trade secret owner who has knowledge of a
misappropriation. As for a trade secret owner without actual knowl-
edge, "[i]f objectively reasonable notice of misappropriation exists,
three years is sufficient time to vindicate one's legal rights," according
to the drafters of the UTSA.'85
The question whether each use of a misappropriated trade secret is
a new violation or whether the first use of a misappropriated trade
secret constitutes the violation has been resolved by the UTSA. Prior
to the UTSA, there had been a conflict of authority in other jurisdic-
tions, 86 but Florida had not addressed the issue. The UTSA rejects
the "continuing wrong" theory that allowed a new statute of limita-
tions to apply to each new use of the misappropriated secret. 87 In-
stead, a continuing misappropriation can only make up a single
claim. 88 The combination of the single claim limitation and the run-
ning of the period from the time of discovery balances the interests
between the need for a clear date at which the statute begins to run
and the need for injured trade secret owners to have adequate time to
discover and assert their claims.
III. GENERAL DEFENSES TO THE UTSA
The UTSA does not specifically provide defenses to a misappropria-
tion. However, throughout the UTSA many defenses are implied.
This section sets forth these implied defenses.
In trade secret litigation, the plaintiff must first show that a trade
secret exists. Almost any information will be considered a trade secret
if it is not generally known and has been kept in reasonable secrecy.
Accordingly, the defendant should attempt to overcome these two as-
pects. Several factors indicating that the information was not secret
are that the information was generally known within the industry, that
the information was published, or that the information was obtained
184. Id.
185. UTSA, supra note 7, § 6 comment.
186. Id, The comment compares Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969), in which no continuing wrong was found and the
period of recovery began upon initial misappropriation, with Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S.
Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967), in which each use
of the trade secret was considered a misappropriation and a separate wrong.
187. Ch. 88-254, § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.007 (Supp.
1988)).
188. Id.
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through reverse engineering.8 9 In addition, the defendant can show
that access to the trade secret is not limited or that the information is
not coded in a manner not easily decipherable. 190
Defendants to whom the secret was voluntarily disclosed may have
difficulty countering a claim of a misappropriation of a trade secret.
Generally if the defendant can prove that the plaintiff did not main-
tain the information in a secret manner, no cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation exists. However, if the defendant is on notice
that the information is a trade secret, the plaintiff may show that
there was indeed a viable trade secret. A defendant is on notice if,
while viewing the trade secret, he is exposed to "obvious security
measures designed to keep the trade secret from general view ...[or
he] is advised that the process has just recently been developed after
considerable time and effort."1 91 Under these types of circumstances
the defendant is on notice that he is dealing with a trade secret and
that there are certain legal rights accorded to the owner of the infor-
mation.
A defendant could also present the additional defense of "inde-
pendent development" of the trade secret. 192 The defendant must pre-
sent sufficient evidence that the claimed trade secret was a product of
his own research and development. 93 Once there is proof that there
was a trade secret, the plaintiff must show that the trade secret was
misappropriated by improper means. Therefore, one defense available
to the defendant is that he is in possession of the trade secret by
proper means. 194
Some trade secrets may represent only a small change in an existing
process, and misappropriation of this kind of trade secret is hard to
prove. Considerable increase in the defendant's efficiency, speed,
quality or decreases in his cost of production should indicate that
189. See UTSA, supra note 7, § 1 comment. Reverse engineering refers to discovery of the
secret by dismantling a product incorporating the secret. If discovery by this method is easy, the
information is not secret; if the discovery is expensive and time consuming, the information
discovered may still be secret-but the discoverer did not act by improper means and may retain
the information so learned as a trade secret.
190. See Z. CAviTCH, supra note 15, § 233.03[2] (citing Auto Wax Co. v. Byrd, 599 S.W.2d
110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)).
191. Klitzke, Trade Secrets: Important Quasi-Property Rights, 41 Bus. LAW. 555, 565
(1986).
192. See id.
193. See Dutch Cookie Mach. Co. v. Vrede, 289 Mich. 272, 286 N.W. 612 (1939) (court held
there was no remedy where the information was readily available by researching the industry's
trade journals).
194. See Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Mach. Corp., 240 F. Supp. 126, 141 (E.D. Wis. 1965) (ab-
sent explanation by the defendant of how it properly obtained the information through proper
means the court assumed that the defendant must have used improper means).
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there has been a trade secret misappropriation; insignificant changes
may indicate otherwise. 9
Lastly, the underlying intent of the prohibition of trade secret mis-
appropriation is based on ethical business practices. In light of this
purpose, if the defendant can prove that he has acted in an honest and
straightforward manner, the cause of action against him should fail.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UTSA ON FLORIDA LAW
The specific intent of the UTSA is that the "act shall be applied and
constructed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
with respect to the subject of this act among states enacting it.' ' ,96 In
an effort to effectuate this purpose, the UTSA attempts to displace
conflicting state law based on the misappropriation of a trade secret
except for contractual or criminal based remedies. 97 The statute does
not specifically displace particular laws, rather it makes a general dis-
placement statement. 98 This is the one area where the UTSA may
pose a problem in Florida, since the UTSA does not specifically re-
place section 772.11, Florida Statutes, which provides for a civil trade
secret remedy.l9 Other areas of Florida law dealing with trade secrets
either do not fall under the misappropriation application or are of a
contractual or criminal nature.
In Florida, a plaintiff may bring a civil action for theft of a trade
secret using the substance of the criminal statute. 200 The existence of
195. Klitzke, supra note 191, at 566 (1986).
196. Ch. 88-254, § 9, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1380 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.009 (Supp.
1988)).
197. The pertinent section of the UTSA states:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), this act displaces conflicting tort, restitution-
ary, and other law of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a
trade secret.
(2) This act does not affect:
(a) Contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade se-
cret; or
(b) Other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or
(c) Criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.
UTSA, supra note 7, § 7. See also ch. 88-254, § 8, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379-80 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 688.008 (Supp. 1988)).
198. See id.
199. Section 772.11 provides, "Any person who proves by clear and convincing evidence that
he has been injured in any fashion by reason of any violation of the provision[] of ... s.
812.081 has a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained. FLA. STAT. §
772.11 (1987).
200. Id. The criminal statute, section 812.081(1)(c), defines a trade secret as:
the whole or any portion or phase of any formula, pattern, device, combination of
devices, or compilation of information which is for use, or is used, in the operation of
a business and which provides the business an advantage, or an opportunity to obtain
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this civil remedy may cause some confusion, since it is not specifically
superceded by the UTSA. While the UTSA does purport to "dis-
place[ conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this state pro-
viding civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret," ' 20 there
are some definitional differences between the UTSA and the civil rem-
edy statute that may allow the latter to survive despite the UTSA's
displacement clause.
A significant difference between the existing civil remedy and the
UTSA is that under the civil remedy there is a stronger burden of
proof that must be met than under the UTSA. Under the civil remedy,
a plaintiff must prove by "clear and convincing evidence that he has
been injured in any fashion by reason of any violation" of the crimi-
nal provisions. 20 2 The UTSA only requires a preponderance of proof
by the plaintiff. If a plaintiff can meet the stronger burden of proof
required by the civil remedy, he may wish to proceed on that basis to
take advantage of the treble damages provision. 203
A second distinction between the UTSA and the existing civil rem-
edy is emphasized by the different definition of a trade secret found in
each statute. If the two are judged to purport different meanings, a
litigant may be able to bring a cause of action under one statute when
the requirements of the other are not met. However, the UTSA ap-
an advantage, over those who do not know or use it. "Trade secret" includes any
scientific, technical, or commercial information, including any design, process, proce-
dure, list of suppliers, list of customers, business code, or improvement thereof. Irre-
spective of novelty, invention, patentability, the state of the prior art, and the level of
skill in the business, art, or field to which the subject matter pertains, a trade secret is
considered to be:
1. Secret;
2. Of value;
3. For use or in use by the business; and
4. Of advantage to the business, or providing an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage, over those who do not know or use it when the owner thereof takes measures to
prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner
to have access thereto for limited purposes.
Id. § 812.081(l)(c).
Theft of a trade secret occurs when:
Any person who, with intent to deprive or withhold from the owner thereof the con-
trol of a trade secret, or with an intent to appropriate a trade secret to his own use or
to the use of another, steals or embezzles an article representing a trade secret or
without authority makes or causes to be made a copy of an article representing a trade
secret is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or
s. 775.083.
Id. § 812.081(2) (1987).
201. Ch. 88-254, § 8(1), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379-80 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.008(1)
(Supp. 1988)).
202. FLA. STAT. § 772.11 (1987).
203. See id.
892 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:863
pears to incorporate the existing civil remedy's definition in the broad
definition of a trade secret. The definition of misappropriation under
the UTSA includes the use of improper means. 204 Improper means is
defined as, among other things, "theft." This definition appears to
encompass the civil remedy, thereby making it unnecessary. If this
was the only factor looked at to determine a misappropriation of a
trade secret, the inclusion of theft could certainly appear to displace
the existing civil remedy. However, because the UTSA differs signifi-
cantly from section 772.11 as to the burden of proof required and the
remedy awarded, these factors must be considered also. Furthermore,
since section 772.11 is the only statute that contains a civil remedy for
theft of a trade secret, the UTSA should have specifically displaced it.
A general rule of statutory construction is that the rescinding of a
statute should be explicit. "[T]he mere fact that a later statute relates
to matters covered in whole or in part by a prior statute does not
cause a repeal of the older statute. If the two may operate on the same
subject without positive inconsistency or repugnancy in their practical
effect and consequences, they should each be given the effect designed
for them unless a contrary intent clearly appears. ' ' 205 Moreover,
"where the courts can, in construing two statutes, preserve the force
of both without destroying their evident intent, it is their duty to do
so.'26 The UTSA's attempt to displace conflicting civil remedies for
misappropriation of trade secrets 2 7 would indicate that the intent of
the UTSA is to speak to all wrongful takings of a trade secret. None-
theless, since the UTSA did not specifically displace section 772.11,
the Legislature may have intended to make both remedies available. 20 1
Given the general purpose of the UTSA, to simplify and unify trade
secret law among states, and the all-inclusiveness of the UTSA, the
civil remedy under section 772.11 should no longer be available. How-
ever, there is sure to be some litigation, since section 772.11 provides a
cause of action for treble damages, reasonable attorney's fees and
204. See supra note 88.
205. Ellis v. City of Winter Haven, 60 So. 2d 620, 623 (Fla. 1952) (emphasis added) (quoting
Florida v. Gadsden County, 63 Fla. 620, 629, 58 So. 232, 235 (1912)).
206. Markham v. Blount, 175 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 1965) (repeal by implication not fa-
vored).
207. Ch. 88-254, § 8(1), 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379-80 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 688.008(1)
(Supp. 1988)).
208. The existence of section 772.11 was unknown to the members of the Legislature and
their staff. In interviewing legislative staff on this issue it was revealed that no one had pointed
out the existence of the section. This lack of knowledge leaves in question how the Legislature
would have responded if made aware of its existence. Furthermore, the staff analysis does not
even mention section 772.11. See Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Commerce, SB 233 (1988) Staff
Analysis 1-4 (Apr. 18, 1988) (on file with committee).
TRADE SECRETS A CT
court costs. 20 9 In contrast, the UTSA limits awards of exemplary dam-
ages to twice the actual damage award and awards these and attor-
ney's fees only in cases in which the court finds a willful and
malicious misappropriation.210 Until the Legislature or the courts de-
termine whether the UTSA supercedes the civil trade secret statute, an
uncertainty will remain. This ambiguity negates one of the primary
purposes of the UTSA, that of simplifying trade secret law.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the UTSA is to make trade secret law more uni-
form; it accomplishes this goal by codifying trade secret protection
and incorporating the major common law principles. The UTSA con-
tributes to trade secret law significantly by providing pragmatically
sound remedies. By adopting the UTSA, Florida has signaled to in-
dustry, particularly companies conducting business in more than one
state, that it is a state committed to growth and expansion of the busi-
ness community. Moreover, Florida has conformed its trade secret
law with that of twenty-four other states, thereby providing a stable
business environment in our state. Florida desires to attract new in-
dustry and create a climate for industrial innovation and creativity.
The enactment of the UTSA is a direct response to this goal.
209. FLA. STAT. § 772.11 (1987).
210. Ch. 88-254, §§ 4-5, 1988 Fla. Laws 1377, 1379 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 688.004 -. 005
(Supp. 1988)).
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